In many parts of the world people live in "dual polities": they are governed by the state and organize collective decision-making within their ethnic community according to traditional rules. We examine the substantial body of works on the traditional-state dualism, focusing on the internal organization of traditional polities, their interaction with the state, and the political consequences of the dualism. We find the descriptions of the internal organization of traditional polities scattered and lacking comparative perspective. The literature on the interaction provides a good starting point for theorizing the strategic role of traditional leaders as intermediaries, but large potentials for inference remain underexploited. Studies on the consequences of "dual polities" for democracy, conflict and development are promising in their explanatory endeavor but they do not yet allow for robust conclusions. We therefore propose an institutionalist research agenda addressing the need for theory and for systematic data collection and explanatory approaches.
Introduction
In many states ethnic groups organize collective decision-making, service provision and jurisdiction according to traditional rules of governance. Traditional governance entails, for example, the selection of chiefs and elders, or procedures for decision-making, dispute settlement, land allocation, or inheritance. Contemporary traditional forms of governance coexist with the political institutions and laws of states. Traditional governance is a global phenomenon. Of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 103 recognize the existence of particular ethnic groups in their constitution. Seventy of them grant special cultural or political rights to these communities. Sixty-one countries (as diverse as Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Paraguay and Tuvalu) explicitly recognize forms of traditional governance and customary law (authors' data collection). Only in Europe traditional governance seems to be mostly absent.
The JuriGlobe research group (2016) estimates that 57 percent of the world's population lives in states where customary law and other forms of law coincide. For the African continent, some scholars have identified a veritable "resurgence" of traditional governance from the 1990s onwards (Englebert 2002a; Herbst 2000; Muriaas 2011; Ubink 2008) . While in some states ethnic groups applying traditional governance constitute minorities (in North America, or Australia), elsewhere, large shares of the population live under dual governance (in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or South-Asia). The co-existence of traditional governance institutions ranges from federal arrangements with sizeable autonomy of the traditional polity (in North America) to indigenous rights (in South America) and legislative Houses of Chiefs (in Ghana or Namibia).
Since the traditional-state dualism is especially widespread in regions ridden by internal conflict, delayed democratization, and stalled development (Sub-Saharan Africa, some areas of South Asia), investigating these dynamics systematically seems imperative. Yet, despite the considerable size of the phenomenon of "dual governance", its functions and its consequences are not yet sufficiently understood. How significant is traditional governance today and how does it vary across countries? Under which conditions do traditional institutions survive, or even resurge? Which forms of parallelism of state and traditional governance exist, and how are they regulated? Do state and traditional authorities cooperate, compete, or complement each other? Does traditional governance foster or undermine democracy? Does dual governance intensify or reduce domestic conflict? Are traditional institutions conducive to economic development, or are their economic traditions at odds with the principles of contemporary market economies?
To some degree, these questions have been tackled in a substantial, methodologically diverse, and cross-regional literature. Recent works (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2014; Baldwin 2013 Baldwin , 2014 Baldwin , 2015 Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Koter 2013; Logan 2013; Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili 2015) demonstrate that the topic continues to puzzle political scientists, because traditional governance today complements, substitutes, and challenges state authority in various contexts -be it with regard to public goods provision, conflict resolution, elections, land tenure, human rights, or the role of women in society. Political scientists seek to comprehend the institutional setup as well as the political and socio-economic effects of such dualist systems. Yet, beyond country-level studies, rigorous comparative regional or global perspectives on the interaction of traditional forms of governance and state institutions are still rare. Therefore, a stocktaking of this research area permits highlighting comparative research potentials, in order to launch a broader debate on the phenomenon of traditional governance and its worldwide consequences.
More generally, research on dual governance may also contribute to the understanding of other parallel governance setups, i.e. where the church and the state coexist as regulatory entities within states (Griffiths 1986; Sandberg 2015) , where the EU and state governments vie for authority harmonization in the same territory, or where a variety of IGOs and INGOs 5 provide international hard and soft law that may compete with national rules and with each other (Berman 2012) . The EU actively developed legal strategies to integrate the parallel systems, via the Copenhagen criteria as prerequisite for membership, the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, and various harmonization techniques reaching from minimum to total harmonization (Craig and de Búrca 2011) . Overall, parallelism of political systems, legal rules, and public service provision is a phenomenon of wide-ranging relevance.
Our contribution in this article is twofold: First, we provide a structured, systematic overview of the existing knowledge, and outline fruitful angles of research that can inform a comparative analysis of traditional governance and its interaction with the state. Second, based on our mapping of existing work, we specify research potentials and sketch exemplary hypotheses to tackle lacunae in the literature as a reference for future comparative research.
We proceed as follows: first, we provide the conceptual background to study the dualism of traditional governance and the state and present the analytical framework we employ to capture the phenomenon. In the second section we apply this framework to map the existing knowledge on dual governance, and discuss the academic literature speaking to our topic. This literature mirrors the varying significance of traditional governance across the continents. Much of the research has focused on sub-Saharan Africa, and thus the majority of the discussed studies concentrate on the continent. In the final section, we formulate future alleys for comparative research built on what has been contributed so far in terms of theory, data, and systematic empirical evidence.
Conceptual Background and Analytical Framework

Delineation of Traditional Governance and Dualism
By traditional we refer to a form of governance understood and validated through narratives or procedures deemed "traditional" by constituents. It is usually not codified, has been applied for quite some time, and refers to the past of an ethnic community (cf. Zartman 2000: 7). The 6 term traditional is not equivalent to ancient or primordial. We are agnostic as to how old the "tradition" is, and whether it was invented" or not (Ranger 1983) . The term mainly refers to a mode of legitimization of political institutions.
We choose the term governance implying the political function of steering a community (the "ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services" in the words of Fukuyama 2013, 350) . Governance refers to organizations and to rules aiming at regulating behavior and taking decisions for a collective. The concept of traditional authorities, by contrast, denotes persons and organizations, whereas traditional political institutions encompass organizations and procedural rules, but not the substantial rules or services the political system generates.
The term traditional governance thus captures a variety of traditional authorities such as chiefs, kings, headmen, queen mothers, councils of elders, etc. It also captures traditional procedural rules such as mechanisms for conflict resolution or leadership selection. Finally, it includes the substantial rules with respect to internal security, land and resource allocation, public health, or matters of marriage and inheritance.
Polity dualism (Buur and Kyed 2007) describes the coexistence of two distinct political and legal systems in the same territory and applying to the same people: the state and traditional governance. Scholars have introduced various terms to designate this particular institutional setup: "mixed government" (Sklar 2005) , "twilight institutions" (Lund 2007) or "hybrid political orders" (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009 ), but dualism is the most precise notion to describe the co-existence of two polities.
The Dual Institutional Setup and its Consequences
Below, we systematize the knowledge on the political institutions that traditional systems of governance entail today. This task requires accounting for the variance of such institutions across ethnic groups, countries, and regions. We therefore distinguish two broad domains of research: (1) the institutional setups involving traditional governance, i.e. the internal 7 organization of traditional communities, and the forms of co-existence of traditional governance and the state; and (2) the political consequences of the dualism for democracy, peace and conflict, and development. Based on these domains, we identify, discuss, and structure the existing knowledge on dual governance in the following section.
These domains also roughly mirror the chronological order of research on traditional governance since the 1950s. We present them as a "best fit" to capture the literature most relevant to political science. We acknowledge, however, that further areas have been investigated in the past. In particular, there is a large body of research on customary land rights that is covered excellently elsewhere (Boone 2014 for Africa, Stocks 2005 for Latin America). Similarly, we do not include the literature on the use of traditional approaches for transitional justice processes (e.g. Corey and Joireman 2004) . Finally, since our interest is the contemporary dual setup, and as we cannot do justice to the diverse history of traditional polities within the scope of our discussion here, we point the reader to the excellent ethnographic and historical perspectives on the topic in Murdock (1967) , Ross (1983 ), Ayittey (1993 , Davidson (1992) , Osabu-Kle (2000) .
1 Structuring existing works along our analytical framework allows us to pinpoint the most fruitful angles of research and potentials for future analysis. Gluckman (1965) and Nader and Todd (1978) offer comparisons of political and legal systems of some African tribes, most studies remain single ethnic-group oriented.
Mapping the Dualism of Traditional Governance and the State
These studies provide a fertile basis for the understanding of social and political hierarchies and legal attributes of indigenous societies. To map today's political organization of traditional polities, scholars could start from these studies and assess contemporary institutions for the same groups. However, most typological distinctions so far lack analytical clarity. Categories for (de)centralization, the political and administrative functions, or the selection of rulers are neither sufficiently explained nor analytically separated. To understand the principles of internal organization across traditional polities, scholars need to move beyond one-dimensional scaling.
Institutional Setup: Co-existence and Interaction of Traditional Governance and State
The coexistence of multiple legal structures in one state (i.e. legal pluralism) and the question how to incorporate customary law into modern state law have been studied since the 1960s (Allott 1984; Read 1963; e.g. Benjamin 2008; Hinz 2010) . Various typologies of statetraditional legal integration have been proposed. For cases across the world, Forsyth (2007, 69 ) develops a typology of relationships between non-state and state justice systems -with seven models distinguished by the degree to which the state agrees to non-state adjudication.
Beyond legal integration, Ubink (2008) Similarly, Koter (2013) (Murtazashvili and Murtazaschvili 2015) . Koelble and LiPuma (2011) show more generally that government and chiefs engage in a mutually advantageous relationship. In South Africa, chiefs have used the weakness of the state in rural hinterlands to "position themselves as intermediaries, even decision makers, between state and society" (p. 6). While chiefs had only minor influence following their collaborative role during apartheid, the authors describe traditional leaders' resurgence as a consequence of the rise of democracy, the dysfunctional provincial administration, and the support of the African National Congress (ANC). Traditional leaders engage in reforms to receive constitutional recognition and leverage over land, and the government uses the chiefs to "help mediate the relationship between the urban-based liberal state and an impoverished isolated hinterland" (p. 13; cf. Oomen and van Kessel 1997) .
In sum, research on the co-existence of traditional governance and the state falls into two categories. Studies of legal pluralism deal with the parallelism of norm systems, their potential collision, and attempts at formal integration. Political scientists study the interaction of traditional and state actors, depicting both as strategic political actors, the chiefs acting as intermediaries and vote brokers. The insights gained from these studies serve as a fruitful basis for the development of theory and general hypotheses.
Consequences: Democracy
Researchers have also studied the consequences of traditional governance for democracy.
Two competing normative approaches in the literature have been referred to as the neotraditional and neo-liberal paradigms (Davidson 1992; ECA 2007a; Keulder 1998) . Neotraditionalists view traditional leadership as compatible with democratic governance due to elements such as consensual decision-making and public participation (Adedeji 1994; Keulder 1998; Nabudere 2004; Oomen 2005; Osabu-Kle 2000) . By contrast, the neo-liberal approach argues that traditional institutions contradict the idea of liberal democracy because they disregard democratic procedural standards, gender equality and human rights (Mamdani 1996; Ntsebeza 2005) .
Systematic empirical proof for these claims is still lacking. On the more skeptical side, Using the Afrobarometer, Logan (2009 Logan ( , 2013 
Consequences: Peace and Conflict
Traditional governance institutions might contribute to internal ethnic conflict, because a deep-seated organization on the level of ethnic groups may intensify feelings of identity and facilitate ethnic mobilization and hostility toward other groups. On the contrary, the inclusion of traditional authorities in domestic politics might maintain security, because dispute resolution is a classic function of traditional governance. Concerning traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, the findings range from positive (Menkhaus 2000) to skeptical views on its performance (Osaghae 2000) . Few studies deal directly with the integration of traditional conflict resolution models into the state system.
Zartman's (2000) collection of "traditional cures for modern conflicts" among ethnic groups
in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sudan evaluates the potential of traditional dispute resolution to resolve current conflicts. The authors come to different conclusions concerning its effectiveness, however.
As with democracy, analyses of traditional institutions, peace, and dispute resolution differ in their conclusions as to the applicability and performance of such. Wig (2014) provides rare evidence for a positive relationship between traditional governance and domestic peace. Overall, the consequences of traditional-state dualism on peace and conflict seem underexplored.
Consequences: Socio-economic Development
Studies of traditional governance and socio-economic development primarily address the incorporation of traditional institutions into developmental policies. Various studies, e.g. ECA The latter studies all focus on pre-colonial political organization, i.e., the statistical correlations do not capture the effects of contemporary traditional governance. The mechanisms of how pre-colonial structure should affect today's development after such a long time remain unclear. While the explanatory approach of these studies provides valuable insights, relying on contemporary data seems desirable. At least, if pre-colonial data is used, we need causal theories to explain historical path dependence.
A research agenda
In the remainder, we discuss the research deficits and sketch how the lacunae can be filled.
We start with the need for theory and continue with the need for comprehensive data and explanatory -qualitative or quantitative -empirical work.
Need for Theory
Conceptual work on traditional governance has largely focused on terminology and typologies. Typologies provide a first step in order to grasp variation of the phenomenon.
Often, however, these classifications are neither distinct nor complete. Furthermore, categories have rarely been applied to a larger number of cases.
What is rare in the literature is causal theory. (1999, 24) examine the relationship of traditional and state authorities in political economy terms, as do Acemoglu et al. (2014) in their study of chiefs influence on development. Boone (1998) uses a theoretical framework of institutional choice to examine the diverse institutional topography of rural Africa. Most importantly, Baldwin (2013 Baldwin ( , 2014 Baldwin ( , 2015 and Koter (2013) analyze traditional leaders in view of chief's incentives and democratic theory.
As in these works, existing political science theories need to be applied to explain the contemporary significance of traditional governance and related political consequences.
Traditional governance must be recognized for what it is: a variety of political system governing communities, which requires analysis in the same ways political scientists have approached state institutions.
A theory of traditional governance will inevitably vary depending on what is to be explained and on context. The consequences of co-existence and interaction of state and traditional authorities and thus causal links play out differently in our three domains:
democracy, conflict, and development. Furthermore, co-existence and interaction take place in different contexts on which causal paths are contingent. In particular, the significance of traditional communities, whether the state is a democracy or autocracy, more or less developed, or more or less ethnically diverse will all affect the causal processes.
Yet, in our view rationalist institutional theories are a promising candidate for an overarching approach because they seem particularly relevant to the subject. The dual polity is problematic because of the potential incompatibility of two institutional systems in one territory. Institutional theories emphasize that explicit legal integration and institutional 19 harmonization are needed to reduce coordination costs and manage the dual polity. Economic institutionalism, for example, focuses on the complementarity of institutions as an important factor for the functioning of markets and for development (North 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001) . In this respect the interaction and potential incompatibility of the state-traditional dualism is not different from e.g. state-church relations, global legal pluralism (Berman 2012) , or federal and supra-national arrangements such as the EU.
This reasoning leads to our first and basic hypothesis:
(H1) The less legal integration and harmonization of state and traditional institutions we observe in a country, the more negative consequences will appear.
Legal integration or harmonization may take many forms, as the EU examples above indicate. We expect a country regulating and integrating traditional und state institutions in detail (e.g., developing a common judicial system) to face less adverse effects than a country with unregulated parallelism of two systems. However, we also expect a country trying to separate the diverse polities as much as possible (e.g. by granting territorial political autonomy or delineating competences) to face less adverse consequences than a country not regulating the co-existence.
Second, we expect the effects of legal integration and harmonization to be contingent on the significance of traditional governance. Significance is a consequence of numbers, i.e., the share of population subject to traditional leaders in the overall population. If the share is lower than 2 percent (as in the US) we would not expect to observe any effects beyond the local level. In addition, political significance is a consequence of the powers the traditional leaders exert over their constituencies and within the state. If the traditional authorities are bereaved of most of their competences (as in Tanzania), we would not assume them to cause problems.
We conceive of significance and legal integration as an interactive effect, although we phrase distinct hypotheses.
(H2) The higher the significance of traditional governance in a country the more negative consequences might appear.
What are the negative consequences? We concretize the consequences in terms of democracy, internal conflict and development. We demonstrate the relevance of incompatibility for each domain and propose exemplary hypotheses.
As presented above, the compatibility of traditional governance with democracy was the subject of normative discussions but our empirical knowledge remains limited. We might expect that more democratic traditional polities have a better fit with democratic states and more autocratic traditional polities are more compatible with autocratic states, that is: Turning to development, the provision of public goods in a dual polity requires some degree of cooperation. If two potential providers co-exist, either one of them may provide public goods separately. However, they can also be provided in a collaborative or in a competitive manner (cf. Clayton et al. 2015) . Moreover, there is a risk that goods are not provided at all. We assume that the delineation of competences and the regulation of the modes of production serve to produce institutional fit and complementarity: To test such hypotheses we are in need of data.
Need for Comprehensive Data and Explanatory Research
Despite the large number of empirical studies there is a lack of comprehensive data. Countryand ethnicity-based studies provide a quarry of evidence, but the data is often incommensurable. Although scholars focus on common research themes, the contexts and methods differ. Further, systematic datasets containing worldwide or longitudinal data on traditional governance simply do not exist.
To be sure, we recognize the manifold important studies on ethnic politics and the many data sets on these and related issues. 2 Yet, studying ethnicity is not equivalent to studying contemporary traditional governance. It is precisely our point that the academic literature lacks data on the current organizational principles within ethnic groups and on traditional polities' interactions with states, and thereby neglects the political and social consequences of traditional governance today.
To our knowledge, there are three sources of quantitative data that have been used for research on traditional governance: Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set, and the Afrobarometer survey. The Ethnographic Atlas covers 1167 societies worldwide between 1962 and 1980 (Murdock 1967 (Murdock , 1981 . The Atlas provides some information on traditional governance by, for example, classifying societies according to jurisdictional hierarchy (Murdock 1967, 52) The case study data focuses on a limited number of topics and remains geographically concentrated. According to our review, this body of scholarship concentrates mostly on Africa and covers only about half of that continent. Whereas large parts of Africa are insufficiently studied, a few countries (in particular South Africa, Ghana, Namibia, Somaliland, or Uganda) attract most of the attention. Moreover, these studies focus merely on the governance structures within one country, and in most cases on only one traditional polity. With few exceptions, such as studies of Sierra Leone (Acemoglu et al.2014) , Namibia (Hinz 2010) , and Zambia (Baldwin 2014) , no within-state comparisons of different traditional institutions exist.
To be able to study the broader phenomenon of dual polities and legal pluralism, and to test hypotheses such as those outlined above, research on polity dualism and its consequences requires systematic, comparable, and reliable data on several dimensions:
• Data on the contemporary political significance of traditional governance for each ethnic group and country would be a basic prerequisite for an evaluation of its consequences on democracy, conflict, and development.
• Data on the legal integration of traditional governance in states' political systems, be it at the constitutional or ordinary law level, would allow to evaluate the effects of acknowledgement and harmonization on democracy, conflict and development (institutional fit).
• Data on the various types of contemporary traditional governance structures would be helpful to understand to which degree traditional governance is compatible with democracy. To assess the democraticness of traditional polities new measurements might be needed.
• Data on public service provision and the performance of traditional institutions alone and in interaction with governments would allow for the estimation of their potential to complement states.
Such data would be most useful if collected on a worldwide scale and if it were longitudinal.
To be sure, such a large body of data cannot be collected quickly by small-scale research projects. Only after systematic collection of such material, however, can coherent explanation follow.
The lack of theory and systematic data result in a lack of explanatory empirical research. Hypothesis-testing quantitative or experimental research is still rare -although rapidly growing in recent years. Attempts at generalizable knowledge are mostly very recent; of these, many still base their analysis on Murdock's pre-colonial data. Most case studiesthough valuable as exploratory hypothesis-generating endeavors -are not explanatory in the sense that they test hypotheses. Although theory-guided comparative and single case studies can serve to determine causality, given the current state of knowledge, a comprehensive 25 understanding of the political role of traditional governance necessitates greater scope. Only broadly based approaches will enable us to identify conditions and covariates of the various outcomes of polity dualism. Only comparative approaches will allow the concerned countries to learn from one another how to deal with the challenge of potential incompatibilities.
Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to summarize and structure the existing knowledge on the dualism of traditional and state governance. We find that the description of the internal organization of traditional communities is scattered, somewhat dated, and lacks a comparative perspective.
The literature on the co-existence and interaction of traditional governance with the state has produced a number of interesting approaches to describe and explain the strategic role of traditional leaders as intermediaries between politicians and population. The studies on the consequences of traditional governance and the contemporary dualism for democracy, peace and conflict, and socio-economic development are promising but do not allow for robust conclusions. Only very recently have studies been undertaken dealing with the contemporary developmental potential of pre-colonial organization, popular attitudes towards traditional leaders, and the conflict propensity of ethnic groups. Effects on other dimensions of societies and states, such as cohesiveness, social trust, accountability, or state capacity are yet to be observed. Nevertheless, the existing body of work provides a solid foundation for further research.
In sum, valid inference about the dualism of traditional governance and the modern state is currently difficult to draw. Consequently, the academic knowledge of this significant phenomenon remains limited. We suggest a rational institutional framework in order to derive testable hypotheses. Only theory-guided explanatory research, based on systematically collected data, can provide us with reliable answers to questions as to the causes and effects 1 We are conscious of how this goal necessarily limits the detail we can devote to each discussed contribution. We include only those studies that closely correspond to our framework. Inescapably, many works had to be left out, for reasons of space constraints, although they provide valuable contributions to the phenomenon. For further interest in traditional institutions see Geschiere (1993) , Boone (1998) 
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